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Capital Gains and Losses-The
"Sale or Exchange" Requirementt
By BORIS I. BITTKER*
By virtue of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 1222, capi-
tal gains and losses arise from "the sale or exchange" of capital
assets. Because this statutory requirement is clearly satisfied by
most routine dispositions of investment assets, such as sales of se-
curities on a securities exchange or over the counter, it is easily
overlooked in peripheral situations-for example, termination of
the taxpayer's interest in a capital asset by theft, abandonment, or
condemnation-that do not constitute a conventional "sale or ex-
change." Moreover, Congress has dispensed with the technical re-
quirement of a "sale or exchange" in many of these peripheral situ-
ations, so that its residual importance in a few remaining
circumstances can be a trap for the unwary.
Interpreting the phrase "sale or exchange" in these residual
situations is made difficult by the absence of any legislative expla-
nation of its function. At first blush, the phrase seems to specify
the circumstances in which the taxpayer must compute gain or
loss, thus distinguishing realized from unrealized capital gains and
losses. This cannot be the function of section 1222, however, be-
cause IRC section 1001(a), providing that a gain or loss -is to be
computed on "the sale or other disposition" of property, applies to
both capital and noncapital assets. Thus, section 1001(a) requires
increases and decreases in the value of property to be taken into
account when the taxpayer engages in a "sale or other disposition"
of the property, at which time the adjusted basis of the property is
subtracted from the amount realized in order to compute gain or
loss.
tCopyright 1981, Boris L Bittker
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Ster-
ling Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., 1938, Cornell University; LL.B., 1941, Yale
University.
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In applying section 1001(a), therefore, it is sometimes neces-
sary to decide whether the taxpayer has "sold or otherwise dis-
posed of" the property or has merely licensed or leased it, because
these less drastic methods of exploiting the property do not termi-
nate the taxpayer's financial interest in it and hence do not call for
a computation of gain or loss. Because section 1001(a) uses the
term "sale or other disposition" as a label for the circumstances in
which the taxpayer's financial interest in property has been suffi-
ciently terminated to justify taking his or her previously unrealized
gain or loss into account, there is no need for this function to be
discharged a second time by the "sale or exchange" concept of sec-
tion 1222.
It has occasionally been suggested that involuntary transac-
tions, which are encompassed by the phrase "sale or other disposi-
tion" as used by section 1001, should be denied capital gain status
on the grounds that the lower rate was enacted to remove tax ob-
stacles to sales and that this "lock-in effect" is absent from trans-
actions that are forced on the taxpayer, such as condemnations
and other involuntary conversions.1 Despite this theory, which fo-
cuses on the "anti-lock-in" function of the capital gain rate to the
exclusion of its "anti-bunching" function, the Supreme Court held
in Helvering v. Hammel,' decided in 1941, that a foreclosure sale
was a "sale or exchange" resulting in capital gain or loss treatment.
In the absence of a cogent reason for requiring the taxpayer's
interest in capital assets to be terminated in a special way in order
to qualify for capital gain or loss treatment-and none has been
suggested-it would be appropriate to interpret "sale or exchange"
as used in section 1222 as coextensive with "sale or other disposi-
tion" as used in section 1001(a). Evidence that the difference in
phraseology is accidental can be found in section 1001(c), which
uses the phrase "sale or exchange" but is intended to apply to all
closed transactions and thus to cover the same ground as section
1001(a).3
1. See Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 351 (5th Cir. 1967) (capital gain rate
might have encouraged taxpayer to sell or exchange an asset but could have had no bearing
on an involuntary transaction).
2. 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
3. A purposeful distinction between "sale or exchange" and "sale or other disposition"
is also inconsistent with the fact that § 206 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, which
introduced the phrase "sale or exchange," was explained by the Senate Finance Committee
as designed to limit the tax burden on "the net gain derived from the sale or other disposi-
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In Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co.,' decided in
1941, however, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer did not
engage in a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of section 1222
when its business plant was destroyed by fire and it was compen-
sated for the loss by insurance:
Generally speaking, the language in the Revenue Act, just as
in any statute, is to be given its ordinary meaning, and the words
"sale" and "exchange" are not to be read any differently...
Neither term is appropriate to characterize the demolition of
property and subsequent compensation for its loss by an insur-
ance company. Plainly that pair of events was not a sale. Nor can
they be regarded as an exchange, for "exchange". . . implies re-
ciprocal transfers of capital assets, not a single transfer to com-
pensate for the destruction of the transferee's asset.5
Because the events in William Flaccus Oak Leather Co. consti-
tuted a "sale or other disposition" within the meaning of the statu-
tory predecessor of section 1001(a), the case created a rift between
that phrase end "sale or exchange" that has continued to this day.
As a result, some transactions generate ordinary income or ordi-
nary loss, although a sale of the same property prior to the event
would have produced capital gain or loss. This disparity encour-
ages taxpayers with appreciated assets to engage in anticipatory
sales in order to realize the profit by a "sale or exchange" rather
than wait for a more normal termination of the investment that
will fail to satisfy section 1222. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), in turn, often seeks to frustrate this tactic by asserting that
the purported purchaser is merely the taxpayer's agent or that the
sale lacks substance.7
The resulting battle of wits would be an everyday occurrence
had Congress not intervened in many situations to provide that
a particular method of terminating the taxpayer's investment
should be treated as a "sale or exchange," even though the "ordi-
nary meaning" principle enunciated in William Flaccus Oak
Leather Co. would clearly or arguably lead to a different con-
tion of capital assets." S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1
(pt. 2) C.B. 181, 189.
4. 313 U.S. 247 (1941).
5. Id. at 249. The result in this case was subsequently changed by I.R.C. § 1231(a) for
some assets (for example, capital assets held for more than one year) but not for others (for
example, capital assets held for one year or less).
6. See I.R.C. § 111 (1935).
7. For a discussion of anticipatory sales, see notes 72-73 & accompanying text infra.
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clusion.
This Article analyzes Congress' attempt to bring order to the
varying interpretations of the "sale or exchange" requirement of
section 1222. The Article first examines the status of borderline'
transactions that have not been the subject of special legislation.
The Article next describes the so-called statutory sales in which
Congress has expressly determined that the taxpayer's conduct
constitutes a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of section
1222.
"Sale or Exchange" versus "Sale or Other
Disposition"
Foreclosure, Condemnation, Destruction, and Other
Involuntary Events
In Helvering v. Hammel,8 the Supreme Court held that a fore-
closure sale was a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of the
statutory predecessor of section 1222, even though it did not result
from the taxpayer's voluntary action and hence was not a "sale"
for some private law purposes, for example, a property owner's
covenant against sale or assignment of his or her interest.9 It is
sometimes suggested that Hammel is applicable only if the mort-
gagor is released from personal liability on the debt or receives
some other consideration from the foreclosure sale,10 but Hammel
itself does not affirmatively support this refinement. A distinction
between personal liability and nonrecourse financing would also be
inconsistent with Crane v. Commissioner,1 which holds that the
8. 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
9. Id. at 510. See also Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S.
666 (1941) (per curiam) (tat sale; same result).
If the taxpayer-mortgagor has a right to redeem the property under local law, the fore-
closure sale is not complete until the right of redemption is released, expires, or becomes
worthless. Rev. Rul. 70-63, 1970-1 C.B. 36. See Commissioner v. Peterman, 118 F.2d 973
(9th Cir. 1941) (failure of financially solvent owner to pay real estate taxes demonstrates
worthlessness of right of redemption; also, local law provided indefinite period for redemp-
tion); Abelson v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 98 (1941) (nonacquiescence) (same result for
twelve-month redemption period); Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures
and Transfers of Real Property to the Mortgagee, 31 TAx L. Rav. 193 (1976). The existence
of a right to redeem also affects the holding period in distinguishing between long term and
short term capital losses.
10. See Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures and Transfers of Real
Property to the Mortgagee, 31 TAx L. Rav. 193, 239-40 (1976).
11. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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unpaid balance of a nonrecourse mortgage is "realized" by the
mortgagor upon disposition of the mortgaged property. Crane in-
volved a sale under threat of foreclosure, but its rationale is that
the mortgagor receives a "benefit" on disposing of the property
subject to the debt; presumably on this theory, Hammel has been
applied even when the mortgagor is not liable on the debt.12 In
reliance on Hammel, it has been held that property taken by emi-
nent domain is sold or exchanged within the meaning of section
1222, even though for some purposes the event is often described
as a "taking" rather than a "sale" and the payment as "damages"
rather than consideration.13 If, however, the government takes not
the property itself but only the right to use it for a limited period,
the compensation is a substitute for rent, taxable as ordinary in-
come. 1 4 Ancillary payments, such as severance damages and inter-
est to compensate the taxpayer for a delay in awarding or paying
damages, similarly constitute ordinary income rather than pay-
ment for the property.15
When property is destroyed by fire, however, it has been held
that the event does not constitute a "sale or exchange" even if the
taxpayer is compensated for the loss by his or her insurance com-
pany.' Presumably, this judicial refusal to extend the "forced
sale" rationale of Hammel to destruction of property by fire would
also encompass losses from tortious or criminal misconduct, such
as negligence, theft, and embezzlement, as well as the unexplained
disappearance of property as a result of the taxpayer's failure to
keep it under lock and key. If, however, a third party's misconduct
is condoned or forgiven in exchange for a promise to pay for the
property, the taxpayer's agreement may be construed as a con-
structive sale or exchange within the meaning of section 1222, al-
12. See Russo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 135, 152-53 (1977) (citing cases); Rev. Rul. 76-
111, 1976-1 C.B. 214 (nonrecourse purchase money debt was "satisfied" by transfer of prop-
erty back to seller; treated as sale or exchange).
13. See Commissioner v. Kieselbach, 127 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 399 (1943); Hawaiian Gas Prods., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 4 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 653 (1942).
14. See Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
15. See Commissioner v. Kieselbach, 127 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 399 (1943).
16. See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941). There
appear to be no cases involving the impact of an assignment by the insured to the insurer of
rights to damaged or missing property, which might be viewed as a sale or exchange. See
also Rev. Rul. 64-100, 1964-1 (pt. 1) C.B. 130 (involuntary conversion constitutes a sale or
exchange for purposes of LR.C. § 337, relating to corporate liquidations).
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though there appear to be no cases or rulings on point.
Worthless and Abandoned Property
When property becomes worthless, the taxpayer suffers a loss
equal to the property's adjusted basis, but the loss does not arise
from a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of section 1222. In
the case of worthless securities, however, several special provisions
ordinarily require the loss to be treated as though it resulted from
a sale or exchange. When these provisions are not applicable, for
example, in the case of bonds issued by an individual and property
other than securities, the taxpayer suffers an ordinary loss rather
than a capital loss.""
Even if property not only becomes worthless but is abandoned
by the taxpayer, the additional step does not constitute a "sale or
exchange" within the meaning of section 1222. If, however, mort-
gaged property is "abandoned" by a voluntary conveyance to the
creditor, the transfer is treated by the IRS as a sale or exchange
even if the taxpayer is not personally liable on the debt. 9 This
area is murky, however, as is the status of a landowner who "walks
away" from encumbered property, intending thereby to abandon it
before the lienors can foreclose.20
Collection of Claims
In Fairbanks v. United States, 21 the Supreme Court held that
the redemption of a corporate bond was not a sale or exchange and
that the taxpayer's gain, although attributable to an increase in the
17. See I.R.C. §§ 165(g), 166(d)(1)(B), 1244. See notes 86-92 & accompanying text
infra.
18. It should be remembered, however, that a deduction can be taken only if author-
ized by I.R.C. § 165; in particular, property devoted to personal use does not give rise to a
deduction on becoming worthless.
19. Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264. Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir.
1941), holding otherwise, was decided before Crane. The same is true of Jamison v. Com-
missioner, 8 T.C. 173 (1947), which held that a conveyance of property to a municipality for
release of unpaid taxes was not a sale or exchange. But see Fox v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.
704, 715 n.7 (1974) (citing Stokes and Jamison favorably).
20. See Fox v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 704 (1974); Handler, Tax Consequences of
Mortgage Foreclosures and Transfers of Real Property to Mortgagees, 31 TAx L. RIv. 193,
243-44 (1976); Note, Voluntary Conveyances of Property Encumbered by Nonrecourse
Debt: Capital Versus Ordinary Losses and the "Sale or Exchange" Requirement, 13 GA. L.
REv. 243 (1978).
21. 306 U.S. 436 (1939).
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value of a capital asset, constituted ordinary income.2 2 Explaining
its conclusion, the Court stated only that "payment and discharge
of a bond is neither sale nor exchange within the commonly ac-
cepted meaning of the words."2 3 The redemption in Fairbanks oc-
curred before maturity, but the opinion obviously also encom-
passed payments at or after maturity.
When Fairbanks was decided, Congress had already enacted
the predecessor of IRC section 1232, providing that the amounts
paid on the retirement of certain bonds and other obligations
"shall be considered" as paid in exchange therefor. This "statutory
sale" provision did not apply to the taxable year before the Court,
however, and, as will be seen,2' its limited scope continues to leave
a good deal of room for the Fairbanks principle. Open-account and
noncorporate debts, for example, are not covered by Section
1232(a); consequently, the collection of such an obligation pro-
duces ordinary income or loss under Fairbanks even if the claim is
a capital asset. The same principle holds true for compromise set-
tlements of claims and judgments.25
Had Fairbanks gone the other way, merchants selling on
credit would have been invited to claim capital gain treatment on
collecting their claims against customers, and employees might
have asserted that their claims for unpaid salary were "sold" to the
employer for their paychecks. While extravagant assertions like
these would no doubt have been quickly blocked by legislation or
judge-made restrictions, Fairbanks functions as an independent
protective device in this area. Nonetheless, it simultaneously has
the effect of denying capital gain and loss treatment to taxpayers
who purchase claims as investments and hold them until payment
22. Id. at 438. Relying on the reference to "sale or other disposition" in the 1921 legis-
lative reports, S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.2)
C.B. 181, 189, the Board of Tax Appeals had held in 1929 that the statutory phrase "sale or
exchange" included redemptions; it overruled this decision three years later on the ground
that the statutory language was too clear to permit resort to legislative history as an aid to
interpretation. See Watson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932) (overruling Werner v.
Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 482 (1929)).
23. 306 U.S. at 437.
24. See notes 79-85 & accompanying text infra.
25. See, e.g., Canal-Randolph Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977)
(lump-sum settlement of right to receive recurrent payments for stockyard services); Gra-
ham v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1962) (award by United States-German Mixed
Claims Commission held ordinary income; no sale or exchange); Ogilvie v. Commissioner,
216 F.2d 748 (6th Cir. 1954) (satisfaction of judgment debt); Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1936) (compromise payment to settle mortgage notes).
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or settlement by the obligor.2
At first blush, it would seem that a foresighted investor could
avoid Fairbanks by selling his or her claims to a third party rather
than waiting for payment by the obligor. However, because
merchants and employees might also seek to avoid Fairbanks by
selling their claims against customers and employers, 7 the courts
developed a series of doctrines designed to prevent such transac-
tions from being treated as sales of capital assets' 8 and these ob-
stacles, especially the theory that a "naked" contract claim is not
"property" within the meaning of IRC section 1221,29 may also ap-
ply to bona fide investors.
Although a creditor who collects a debt or other claim is not
treated as having sold or exchanged it, a debtor paying a claim
with appreciated or depreciated property realizes capital gain or
loss if the property is a capital asset, because use of the property to
satisfy the claim is treated as a sale or exchange thereof.30 It has
been held, however, that a sale or exchange is lacking when a
shareholder surrenders stock to the issuing corporation on a non-
pro rata basis, receiving no benefit except a possible enhancement
in the book value of the retained shares. 1
Surrender, Cancellation, and Termination of Contract
Rights
The scope of the term "sale or exchange" is also uncertain as
applied to transactions that cancel, terminate, surrender, rescind,
or otherwise extinguish the taxpayer's rights under a contract with
26. See Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1962) (gain on settle-
ment of claim under construction contract acquired by assignment; held, ordinary income
because no sale or exchange).
27. Most such efforts would now founder on I.R.C. § 1221(4), which provides that ac-
counts receivable acquired in the ordinary course of business for services rendered or on the
sale of mechandise are not capital assets.
28. See notes 32-40, 72-73 & accompanying text infra. But see Yates Holding Corp. v.
Commissioner, [1975] T.C.M. (P-H) 79,416 (on facts, taxpayer sold mortgage rather than
compromising mortgage debt; held, capital rather than ordinary loss).
29. If the claim is related to an earlier capital gain or loss transaction, however, it may
take on the same character as the earlier transaction by osmosis under Arrowsmith v. Com-
missioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). See notes 74-78 & accompanying text infra.
30. See Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940) (payment of pecuniary
bequest with appreciated property). -
31. See Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 622 (1976) (transfer constituted contribution
to capital), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 196 (5th
Cir. 1979).
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another person. In common parlance, "sale or exchange" connotes
a transfer of property to a person who will make use of it, rather
than an event that not only terminates the taxpayer's interest but
also simultaneously extinguishes the "property" itself. These char-
acteristics of the bond redemption in Fairbanks, discussed above,
may well have been what the Court had in mind in holding that
the transaction "is neither [a] sale nor exchange within the com-
monly accepted meaning of the words." 2
These "disappearing asset" cases, in which the courts have
held or intimated that there was no "sale or exchange," include
decisions denying capital gain treatment when a musical booking
agent assigned his management contracts to another booking agent
as a prelude to their cancellation so that the transferee could enter
into new contracts with the performers,33 when a distributor was
paid for terminating its exclusive contract with a manufacturer,3
and when a taxpayer was paid to surrender rights under an exclu-
sive contract to purchase coal.' 5
In Commissioner v. Ferrer,"6 however, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit described the line between "a sale to a third
person that keeps the 'estate' or 'encumbrance' alive, and a release
that results in its extinguishment" as a "formalistic distinction,"
asserting that the tax law should not be concerned with whether
the taxpayer's rights are "passed to a stranger or to a person al-
ready having a larger 'estate.' ,,a7 This sensible view could have
been buttressed by noting that if A's contract rights against B are
slated for extinction, they can either be transferred directly to B
32. 306 U.S. at 437. See notes 21-31 & accompanying text supra.
33. General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 866 (1953).
34. Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953). As to distributors with a
substantial capital investment in the distributorship, see notes 103-10 & accompanying text
infra.
35. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919
(1958).
36. 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. Id. at 131. The court pointed to the enactment of 1.R.C. § 1241 (see notes 103-10 &
accompanying text infra) as evidence of "congressional disenchantment" with the distinc-
tion. The enactment of "statutory sale" provisions, however, also has been treated as evi-
dence that "sale or exchange" should be given its normal meaning with expansions being
left to Congress. See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941).
See generally Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The In-
come Tax Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1964); Eus-
tice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAx
L. REv. 1 (1964).
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for compensation or be initially "sold" to C, who can then enter
into a termination agreement with B. Conversely, if A is to be suc-
ceeded by C, A can enter into a termination agreement with B,
who can then enter into a new contract with C, or A can transfer
rights to C with B's consent, and B and C can then modify the
contract, if they so desire, or leave it intact.38 In these situations, A
may or may not know whether the end result is to be a new con-
tract; in either case, no capital gain policy should turn on A's
awareness of either B's or C's plans for the future.
Ferrer, a carefully reasoned case gaining additional authority
because it came from the court that was the major source of the
"dissappearing asset" cases, proved to be a turning point in this
area; later decisions have played down or wholly disregarded the
fact that a contract or other business relationship was "termi-
nated" rather than kept alive in deciding whether it was sold or
exchanged.3 9 In a number of other post-Ferrer disappearing asset
cases, capital gain treatment has been denied on the grounds that
the transferor's rights did not constitute "property" within the
meaning of section 1221 or represented only an opportunity to
earn income from personal services or that the payment was a sub-
stitute for future income.40 Thus, the "formalistic distinction" be-
38. See General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 866 (1953).
39. See Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir. 1975) (earlier
opinion at 476 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973)) (payments received by landlord to release tenant
from obligation to restore leased premises to former condition held ordinary income; no
mention of disappearing asset theory); United States Freight Co. & Subsidiaries v. United
States, 422 F.2d 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (forfeiture of down payment by taxpayer contracting to
purchase stock creates ordinary, not capital, loss; no sale or exchange); Turzillo v. Commis-
sioner, 346 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1965) (proceeds received in settlement of litigation over rights
in employment contract and stock options; held, sale or exchange to extent received for
options); Anderson v. United.States, 468 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1979) (amount received
for release of taxpayer's right of first refusal qualified as capital gain); Kathman v. Commis-
sioner, 50 T.C. 125 (1968) (food distributor denied capital gain treatment for payments to
release salespersons from contract requiring them to purchase through him; reliance on Fer-
rer). But see Rev. Rul. 75-527, 1975-2 C.B. 30 (payment to terminate contract ordinary in-
come because taxpayer's rights "did not pass" to payor; "thus, there was no sale and there
could be no gain from a sale").
40. See Furrer v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
903 (1978) (damages awarded by insurance company to sales manager for breach of agency
contract not paid-for "property"); Vaaler v. United States, 454 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1972)
(payment for cancellation of general insurance agency contract for right to earn income from
personal services); Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963) (same
as to payment to terminate mortgage servicing contract, to the extent not allocable to good-
will; also uses substitute for future income rationale); Flower v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 140
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tween two-party and three-party transactions that was criticized in
Ferrer is fast becoming a footnote to history.
"Sale or Exchange" versus License or Lease
When property is transferred subject to a reservation of rights
in the transferor, the transaction's tax status may be ambiguous. If
it is classified as a sale or exchange, the transferor's adjusted basis
is offset against the amount realized, and the difference can qualify
for capital gain or loss treatment if the transferred property is a
capital asset or qualifies for the hotchpot established by IRC sec-
tion 1231. If, on the other hand, the transaction is classified as a
license or lease, the transferor must report the amounts received as
ordinary income, subject to depreciation or amortization if the
property qualifies for such deductions. Similar problems in classi-
fying borderline transactions are encountered in other areas of the
tax law, but the distinction between sales and licenses is especially
troublesome when taxpayers claim capital gain treatment for
amounts received from transfers of patents, copyrights, franchises,
and other intangible assets,4' if the payments are dependent on the
transferee's use of the property and are not limited in amount.
For many years, this area was devoid of legislative boundaries
and was bitterly contested in innumerable judicial battles between
taxpayers and the IRS. For the last two decades, however, Con-
gress has enacted explicit statutory provisions prescribing the tax
status of specified transactions, thus preempting some of the most
important issues that were formerly left to judicial resolution. 42
The legislation is particularistic rather than comprehensive, how-
ever, and many nooks and crannies remain subject to the case law.
The principal litigated issues can be grouped under three
headings: contingent payments, geographical and field-of-use re-
strictions, and reservations of control, although the facts of many
(1973), aff'd per order, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974) (payments to terminate sales represen-
tation contract taxed as substitute for future income).
41. For an example of an agreement covering a going business, not merely intangible
assets, see Nassau Suffolk Lumber & Supply Corp. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 280 (1969)
(acq.) (purported sale held a license).
42. See I.R.C. § 1221(3) (denying capital asset status to copyrights, literary and musi-
cal compositions, and similar assets held by the creator or certain related persons); id.
§ 1235 (capital gain treatment of certain patent royalties); id. § 1253 (transfers of
franchises, trademarks, and trade names).
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cases overlap these categories.4
Contingent Payments
At an early date, the IRS regularly argued that capital gain
treatment for payments contingent upon the transferee's sales or
profits from the transferred property was inconsistent with the
anti-bunching function of the capital gain provisions, because
these payments-royalties, in common usage-were by their na-
ture spread out over a period of years.44 Had this theory carried
the day, virtually no transfers of patents, copyrights, franchises
and similar assets would have qualified for capital gain treatment
because the difficulty of ascribing a value to these intangibles usu-
ally impels the parties to employ a royalty arrangement. Largely
for this reason, the courts regularly rejected the IRS position.45
In 1958, the IRS bowed to the case law and acknowledged that
patent royalties could qualify for capital gain treatment,46 and in a
1960 ruling, it surrendered as to copyrights:
[T]he consideration received by a proprietor of a copyright for a
grant transferring the exclusive right to exploit the copyrighted
work in a medium of publication throughout the life of the copy-
right shall be treated as proceeds from a sale of property, regard-
less of whether the consideration received is measured by a per-
centage of the receipts from the sale, performance, exhibition or
publication of the copyrighted work, or is measured by the num-
ber of copies sold, performances given, or exhibitions made of the
copyrighted work, or whether such receipts are payable over a pe-
riod generally coterminous with the grantee's use of the copy-
righted work.47
Although the 1958 and 1960 rulings settle the contested issues
for conventional royalty payments received for the use of patents
and copyrights, they do not preclude characterizing less common
arrangements as licenses rather than sales. In 1969, for example,
43. For a detailed account of this subject, see J. BiscHEL, TAXATION OF PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND KNow-How 1 1.3 (1974); Morreale, Patents, Know-How and
Trademarks: A Tax Overview, 29 TAX LAw. 553 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Dreymann v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 153, 162-63 (1948) (capital gain not
restricted to bunched income) (nonacquiescence as to this issue).
45. See, e.g., Coplan v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957) (acq.).
46. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
47. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26, 27. See also Rev. RuL 75-202, 1975-1 C.B. 170
(contingent payments from sale of copyright by author's personal holding company not roy-
alties under I.R.C. § 543(a)).
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the Tax Court held that a purported sale of a going business for
installment payments plus a "license royalty" based on the trans-
feree's sales, to be paid annually for ninety-nine years, perpetuated
the transferor's interest in the business requiring the annual pay-
ments to be reported as ordinary income.4
The IRS' 1958 and 1960 concessions that the transfer of a pay-
ment or copyright on a royalty basis can qualify as a "sale or ex-
change" for capital gain purposes are less important than might
appear at first glance, however, because of two explicit statutory
provisions: (1) IRC section 1235, under which most patent royalties
received by inventors and certain other persons qualify for capital
gain treatment even if the patent is not a capital asset in the tax-
payer's hands; and (2) IRC section 1221(3), denying capital gain
status to copyrights, literary and musical compositions, and similar
assets if held by the person whose personal efforts created the
property or by certain other persons. When these statutory provi-
sions are not applicable, however, the 1958 and 1960 rulings con-
tinue to state the governing principles.
Geographical and Field-of-Use Restrictions
Taxpayers owning patents, copyrights, and other intangibles
often confine their licenses to specified geographical areas, for ex-
ample, the United States or the United States and Canada, or
fields of use, such as book publication or motion picture produc-
tion. The IRS' original position was that geographical and func-
tional divisions were hallmarks of a license, producing ordinary in-
come, rather than a sale, producing capital gains, even if the
assignee was vested with exclusive rights within the specified
domain.49
Like its contingent payment theory, however, the IRS' indivis-
ibility theory of patents and copyrights was rejected by the courts,
which held that the transfer of exclusive rights to a patent, copy-
right, or trademark could be a sale for tax purposes even if re-
stricted to a geographical area or prescribed field of use.50 In 1954,
48. Nassau Suffolk Lumber & Supply Corp. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 280 (1969).
49. See, e.g., I.T. 2735, XII-2 C.B. 131 (1933) (extensive analysis of indivisibility the-
ory as to copyrights), modified as to this issue by Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174 (copy-
rights and trademarks can be divided into separately salable fractions).
50. See, e.g., Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (motion picture
rights to "Forever Amber"); Rouverol v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 186 (1964) (nonacquies-
cence) (geographical and field-of-use restrictions on patents; review of cases); Ranier Brew-
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the IRS accommodated itself to these judicial defeats by aban-
doning its indivisibility theory as to copyrights, acknowledging
that copyrights and trademarks can be divided "into separately
saleable fractions,"51 and ruling that the transfer of the exclusive
right to exploit a copyrighted work in a particular medium, such as
motion pictures, can qualify as a sale.52 The 1954 ruling was re-
stricted to transfers for a fixed amount, but it was modified in 1960
to include conventional royalty agreements, contingent on the
number of copies sold or the assignee's receipts. 3
Reservations of Control
Geographical and field-of-use restrictions are often accompa-
nied by provisions requiring the assignee to adhere to quality and
other standards prescribed by the assignor, designed both to en-
sure the continued flow of income from the assigned rights and to
prevent debasement of the assignor's name, symbols, and process.
In the litigated cases, the courts had difficulty finding "a legitimate
place to draw the line between the reservation of sufficient rights
and restrictions to protect [the taxpayer's] continuing financial in-
terest and the reservation of rights to continuing participation in
the business on such a scale that it cannot properly be said that
there was a sale."" In five appellate cases involving Dairy Queen
franchises, for example, the courts reached results that were de-
scribed in a similar case as "essentially irreconcilable." 55 Moreover,
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 162 (1946) (nonacquiescence as to this issue) (geographical
division of trade names), affd per curiam, 165 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948); Seattle Brewing &
Malting Co., 6 T.C. 856 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1948) (same; related'
case). But see Cory v. Conmissioner, 230 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 828
(1956) (current precedential value doubtful). See also J. BIscHEL, TAXATION OF PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND KNow-How 1.3 (1974).
51. Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174.
52. Id. For the current status of geographical and field-of-use restrictions, see LR.C.
§ 1253.
53. Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26.
54. United States v. Wernentin, 354 F.2d 757, 766 (8th Cir. i965) (transfer of Dairy
Queen franchise resembled lease more than sale, as indicated by agreement and conduct of
parties; lessor's active, continuing interest in development and guidance of lessee's business
held incompatible with capital gain treatment of payments; extensive review of cases).
55. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 5796 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (payments received by assignor from assignee of dress pattern business qualified only
in part as capital gains), rev'd in part and remanded, 575 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1978) (on facts,
taxpayer did not have any significant continuing interest or participation in assignee's busi-
ness but only the right to protect value of retained rights). See also Resorts Intl, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 511 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1975) (capital gain treatment denied to payments
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because both the conduct of the parties and their formal contract
rights must be taken into account in determining whether the ar-
rangement is a "sale," the outcome of particular cases is of limited
predictive value. But this area is now largely preempted by the
statutory rules of IRC section 1235, relating to patents, and IRC
section 1253, relating to franchises, trademarks, and trade names.
Bootstrap Sales-Price and Payment Contingent on Fu-
ture Profits
Capital assets are ordinarily sold for a fixed price, and if credit
is extended by the seller, the buyer is usually personally liable for
the unpaid balance. In commercial contexts, however, property is
sometimes sold for a price determined in part by the buyer's future
profits or the productivity of the transferred assets, to a buyer who
assumes no personal liability for the unpaid balance or who has no
assets other than the transferred property. Carried to its logical
extreme, a bootstrap purchase may entail a price wholly dependent
upon future profits to a buyer who makes no down payment, as-
sumes no personal liability for the scheduled payments, and either
supplies no managerial skill or is to be compensated before compu-
tation of the profits from which the payments are to be made.
When the seller reports the profits on a transaction of this .type as
capital gain, the IRS is understandably restive; because there is no
bunching of income, the seller remains fully subject to downside
risks, and the arrangement resembles a joint venture between two
parties to exploit the transferred property and share the profits.
In the fountainhead of learning on this subject, however, the
Supreme Court held that a once-popular bootstrap sale to a tax-
exempt organization generated capital gain for the sellers. In Com-
missioner v. Brown 5--usually known as the Clay Brown case, in
honor of the lead plaintiff in the Tax Court-the transaction en-
under agreement giving assignee neither exclusive nor perpetual rights, forbidding sublicen-
sees and authorizing assignor to fix prices charged by assignee); Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 494 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974) (agreement gave assignor significant control
over assignee's marketing activities); Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d
1004 (Ct. CL 1967) (reserved right to manufacture for own use "so insubstantial as to be of
little tangible value"; held, sale); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928, 1010-18
(1970) (transfers of patented and unpatented technology under agreements with varying
terms; extensive discussion); Cubic Corp. v. United States, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 6105 (S.D. Cal.
1971), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974) (patent rights and know-how).
56. 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (three Justices dissenting).
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tailed the sale of a closely held corporation to a tax-exempt organi-
zation for $1,300,000 (which was found by the Tax Court to be
"within a reasonable range" in light of the corporation's earnings
and net worth), of which $5,000 was payable from the company's
assets and the balance was to be paid within ten years solely from
earnings.57 As prearranged, the exempt buyer liquidated the corpo-
ration and leased its assets to a newly organized corporation,
owned by the seller's attorneys, for 80% of the operating profits,
computed before depreciation and taxes. The exempt organization
was required to pay 90% of the amount received by it to the sell-
ing shareholders to apply to the sales price.58
The function of this labyrinthine arrangement was to protect
the amounts received by the exempt buyer from being taxed to it
as unrelated business income under the pre-1970 version of IRC
section 511.11 With this crucial objective accomplished, the busi-
ness profits realized by the lessee operating company were offset in
large part, if not in their entirety, by its deductions for deprecia-
tion and the rent paid to the exempt lessor; the rents were received
tax free by the lessor; and the selling shareholders, who received
the lion's share of the business profits, offset the basis of their
stock against the payments and reported the balance as long term
capital gain. Because the business profits were virtually untouched
by taxation while traveling through the lessee and lessor, the sell-
ing shareholders were paid off faster (and paid their taxes sooner)
than would have been possible under a similar arrangement with a
taxable buyer.
The down payment in Brown was not only nominal but came
from the transferred company's assets; the purchase price was evi-
dencedby a nonrecourse promissory note; and the business was to
be managed by the principal selling shareholder (the famous Clay
Brown) at a specified salary.60 Thus, the transaction was as close to
a perfect bootstrap for the buyer as could be devised. For practical
purposes-and aside from taxes-the arrangement resembled an
57. See generally Hall, The Clay Brown Case and Related Problems, 18 S. CAL. TAX.
INST. 337 (1966); Kinsey, Bootstraps and Capital Gain-A Participant's View of Commis-
sioner v. Clay Brown, 64 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1966); Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Boot-
strap Sale" of a Business, 108 U. PA. L. Rzv. 623, 943 (1960) (pta. 1-2).
58. 380 U.S. at 567.
59. Before it was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, I.R.C. § 511 did not tax
rents received under leases of the type employed in Clay Brown. See 68A Stat. 1969 (1954).
60. 380 U.S. at 567-68.
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announcement by the selling shareholders that they would draw
$1,300,000 out of the business and then donate the husk to the
exempt organization as a charitable contribution. Attacking the
selling shareholders' claim that their profit was capital gain rather
than ordinary income, the IRS first asserted that the transaction
was a sham and that it did not qualify as a sale for capital gain
purposes because of the economic interest and control retained by
the shareholders.6 1 After losing in the Tax Court and the court of
appeals, however, the IRS ceased to allege that the transaction was
a sham and instead argued the narrower point that the transaction
did not constitute a sale within the meaning of section 1222(3). As
summarized by the Supreme Court:
[The government's] argument is that since the [tax-exempt
buyer] invested nothing, assumed no independent liability for the
purchase price and promised only to pay over a percentage of the
earnings of the company, the entire risk of the transaction re-
mained on the sellers. Apparently, to qualify as a sale, a transfer
of property for money or the promise of money must be to a
financially responsible buyer who undertakes to pay the purchase
price other than from the earnings or the assets themselves or
there must be a substantial down payment which shifts at least
part of the risk to the buyer and furnishes some cushion against
loss to the seller.
To say that there is no sale because there is no risk-shifting
and that there there is no risk-shifting because the price to be
paid is payable only from the income produced by the business
sold, is very little different from saying that because business
earnings are usually taxable as ordinary income, they are subject
to the same tax when paid over as the purchase price of property.
This argument has rationality but it places an unwarranted con-
struction on the term "sale," is contrary to the policy of the capi-
tal gains provision of the Internal Revenue Code, and has no sup-
port in the cases. We reject it.62
Despite its emphasis on the term "sale" as used by section
1222(3), the IRS implicitly acknowledged that the transaction was
a "sale or other disposition" of the stock within the meaning of
IRC section 1001(a), because it computed the shareholders' income
by subtracting the adjusted basis of their shares from the pay-
ments received by them. The offset was not allowed inadvertently;
61. See Brown v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 461, 483-84 (1961), aff'd, 325 F.2d 313 (9th
Cir. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
62. 380 U.S. at 570.
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indeed, on audit, the IRS increased the basis of the shares by cer-
tain legal expenses and thus determined that the gain was less
than the amount reported by the stockholders, although the tax as
asserted was of course higher because the ordinary income rates
were applied by the IRS.' s
In holding that the shareholders in Clay Brown could report
their profit as long term capital gain, the Supreme Court stressed
the factual finding by the Tax Court that the sales price was
"within a reasonable range" in light of the company's earnings and
net worth; pointed out that the shares had in fact appreciated in
value over a period of years, as contemplated by the capital gain
provisions; held that the term "sale" was used by section 1222(3)
in its common and ordinary meaning; and conclqded that the
transaction in the case was a "sale" in which the shareholders real-
ized gain "upon the enhanced value of a capital asset.' ' " The Court
also observed that requiring "a financially responsible buyer who
undertakes to pay the purchase price from sources other than the
earnings of the assets sold or to make a substantial down payment
seems to us at odds with commercial practice and common under-
standing of what constitutes a sale"6 5 and that if such a rule was to
be imposed, Congress was the proper governmental agency to do
so.6
6
The Court might have added that judicial adoption of the gov-
ernment's risk shifting theory would have required case by case
evaluations of the adequacy of the down payment, the buyer's
financial responsibility, and the managerial services supplied by
the buyer in future transactions resembling, but not replicating,
the Clay Brown transaction. Moreover, if the price paid for the
transferred property does not exceed its fair market value, the cap-
ital gains reported by the sellers are the same as they would have
reported on a conventional sale of the property to a financially re-
sponsible buyer, a fact suggesting that the Clay Brown sellers may
have been, after all, only sheep in wolves' clothing.67
When responding to Clay Brown in 1969, Congress avoided
the enforcement problems adumbrated above by taxing rents of
63. Record at 57, Brown v. Commissioner; 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
64. 380 U.S. at 572-73.
65. Id. at 575.
66. Id.
67. See Kinsey, Bootstraps and Capital Gain-A Participant's View of Commissioner
v. Clay Brown, 64 McH. L. Rzv. 581, 607 (1966).
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the Clay Brown type to the exempt organization as unrelated busi-
ness income, rather than adding a risk shifting requirement to the
capital gain rules.6 8 Although the 1969 statutory change eliminated
the appeal of Clay Brown transactions to tax-exempt organiza-
tions, it did not undercut the Court's decision, and Clay Brown
transactions are still feasible with buyers who have operating loss
carryovers that can be applied against the business profits or who
are subject for other reasons to low tax rates."" If the purchase
price is excessive, however, it has been held that Clay Brown ap-
plies only to the reasonable portion and that the excess must be
reported as ordinary income.70 Moreover, Clay Brown does not ex-
plicitly reject the government's "sham" argument, which can prob-
ably be revived for use in such special circumstances as a sale of
stock to children of the sellers or to a family trust.
Transactions resembling Clay Brown, in that the sales price
depends on the productivity of the transferred property, include
transfers of patents and franchises for an amount dependent on
the transferee's use of the property or receipts from subassignees
and transfers of income producing property for a private annuity
in amounts calculated to income. These analogues to Clay Brown
use different techniques but similarly cause the transferred prop-
erty to pay for itself. 1
68. See LR.C. § 514.
69. See Rev. Rul. 66-153, 1966-1 C.B. 187 (IRS will continue to litigate if amount pay-
able for stock exceeds its fair market value). See also LR.C. § 483 (requires unstated inter-
est in deferred payments to be reported as ordinary income rather than capital gain if the
contract does not provide for interest at the rate prescribed by the IRS) (not applicable to
the taxable years in Clay Brown); University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1971) (loss of tax-exempt status where charitable organization became a "used-
business dealer").
70. See Berenson v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1974) (remanding case to
divide purchase price between amount attributable to accumulated value of transferred
property when sold and amount attributable to buyer's "extra purchasing power" by virtue
of tax-exempt status). For the proceedings on remand, see 612 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1979). See
also Kraut v. Commissioner, 527 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1975) (Tax Court's allocation upheld);
Raymond Allen, [1975] T.C.M. (P-H) 75,039 (extensive review, with citations; purchase
price within reasonable range, as required by Clay Brown).
71. See, e.g., Boone v. United States, 470 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1972) (sale of closely held
insurance company for $10,500,000, with down payment of $1,000,000 and balance to be
paid solely from premiums collected by buyer on transferred policies; held, seller entitled to
report profit as capital gain on establishing that price was not "outlandish").
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Anticipatory Sales
On the eve of a property transaction that will produce ordi-
nary income, taxpayers sometimes attempt to convert the antici-
pated ordinary income into long term capital gain by selling the
property to a third person, who then steps into the taxpayer's
shoes and consummates the transaction as originally contemplated.
These transactions ordinarily fail to achieve their objectives, under
the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine.7 2 Because of the
breadth of this doctrine, the courts usually can avoid questioning
the bona fides of the purported sale, although that could often be
an alternative ground of decision, particularly if the intervening
third party is related to or financed by the taxpayer.7 8
Transaction Related to Prior Sale or Exchange
In two categories of transactions, both important although of
uncertain scope, the courts relate current receipts to an earlier sale
or exchange, so that capital gain or loss treatment results even
though the current transaction, if viewed in isolation, does not sat-
isfy the "sale or exchange" requirement of section 1222.
Open Transaction Cases
The first category consists of so-called open transaction cases,
in which the taxpayer sells or exchanges property under a contract
calling for a series of variable or contingent payments, usually re-
lated to the gross receipts, profits, or production generated by the
transferred property. If the contract rights cannot be valued with
reasonable accuracy, the seller's gain or loss cannot be computed in
the year of the sale; but when the payments are received, they en-
joy the same status that they would have occupied if received in
the earlier year. 4 Thus, if the property was a capital asset, the dif-
ference between its adjusted basis and the amount ultimately re-
ceived under the contract qualifies as capital gain or loss.
72. See, e.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); United States v. Dresser In-
dus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1963).
73. See Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942).
74. In bootstrap sales involving a price contingent on future profits or productivity,
see notes 56-71 & accompanying text supra, the courts assume that contingent contracts can
be valued with sufficient accuracy to decide whether the purchase price is excessive but still




On the other hand, if the contract rights can be valued in the
year of the sale, the transaction is "closed" by computing the tax-
payer's gain or loss as of that date, capital gain or loss is computed
at that time, and if the later collections exceed or fall short of the
value assigned to the contract, the difference usually constitutes
ordinary income or loss because the contract has not been sold or
exchanged, even though there was a sale or exchange of the origi-
nal property.7 5
Relation Back to Earlier Transaction
In the second category of cases, a sale or exchange in an earlier
year determines how a later transaction is to be characterized; in
effect, the courts dispense with the requirement of a technical sale
or exchange in the later year in order to relate its events to the
earlier capital gain or loss transaction. The leading case in this
area is Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,6 in which the Supreme
Court held that taxpayers who reported capital gain on the liqui-
dation of a closely held corporation were required to treat their
subsequent payment of unpaid corporate obligations as a capital
loss despite the absence of a sale or exchange at that time, because
payment of the obligations by the corporation before liquidation
would have reduced the taxpayers' capital gain on the liquida-
tion. In the same vein, payments that can be viewed as retroac-
tive adjustments to the sales price of a capital asset are related
back to the original transactiqn so as to qualify for capital gain or
loss treatment, even though, viewed in isolation, they do not entail
a sale or exchange of a capital asset.
Statutory Modifications of Sale or Exchange
Requirements
Retirement of Bonds and Other Obligations
Section 1232(a)(1) provides that amounts received on the re-
tirement of certain bonds and other evidences of indebtedness
"shall be considered" as having been received in exchange for the
75. B. BrrrKc & J. EuSTICE, FEDm INCOME TAXAToN OF CORPOR TONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 11.30 (4th ed. 1979).
76. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
77. Id. at 8-9.
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bonds, with the result that capital gain or loss is realized if the
obligation is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. 8 By giv-
ing the retirement the status of a "statutory sale," section
1232(a)(1) dispenses with the need for a technical sale or exchange,
thus avoiding an anomalous disparity between a bond that is sold
by the holder just before retirement and one that is held until re-
tirement. Retirements that are outside the scope of section
1232(a)(1), however, are subject to the holding in Fairbanks v.
United States,79 that the redemption of a bond is not a "sale or
exchange" thereof.80
Section 1232(a)(1) embraces bonds, debentures, notes, certifi-
cates, and other evidences of indebtedness that (a) are capital as-
sets in the hands of the taxpayer and (b) were issued by a corpora-
tion or a government or political subdivision thereof. It has been
held that the term "evidences of indebtedness" is not limited to
instruments evidencing an unconditional obligation to pay a sum
certain in money at a fixed or determinable date but also includes
amounts payable from a designated source or fund.8 Because the
Fairbanks rule applies when section 1232(a)(1) is inapplicable, the
following self-contained limits on section 1232(a)(1) should be
noted: (1) Section 1232(a)(1) applies only to evidences of indebt-
edness issued by corporations and governmental bodies, not to
those issued by individuals and partnerships; (2) Even in the case
of corporate and governmental debtors, section 1232(a)(1) applies
only to "evidences of indebtedness," not to open-account loans and
similar claims. Moreover, if the obligations were issued before Jan-
uary 1, 1955, section 1232(a)(1) applies only if they were issued
with interest coupons or in registered form, or were in registered
78. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(1).
79. 306 U.S. 436 (1939).
80. Id. at 437. See notes 21-27 & accompanying text supra.
81. See Jamison v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
445 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1971) (amounts received by assignees of real estate developer from
utility company, based on revenue received by utility from customers); Wilson v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C. 723 (1969) (acq.) (same, with extensive discussion). See also Trees. Reg.
§ 1.1232-1(c)(1), T.D. 7311, 1974-1 C.B. 234 (interpreting "evidence of indebtedness" to in-
clude face amount certificates issued by investment companies, as defined by the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1976)); Greenvine Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 926 (1963) (acq.) (payments on revolving fund credits in cooperative
marketing association produced capital gain, either as redemption of stock under I.R.C. §
302(a) or as retirement of evidences of indebtedness under I.R.C. § 1232(a)(1)). Greenvine




form on March 1, 1954;82 (3) Section 1232(a)(1) applies only to
amounts received on the "retirement" of a bond or other evidence
of indebtedness. In McClain v. Commissioner,5 the Supreme
Court held that the term "retirement" is broader than "redemp-
tion," including payments by a financially embarrassed obligor to
retire its bonds for less than their face amount, as well as pay-
ments to redeem obligations in accordance with their terms." The
difference in McClain between the adjusted basis of the bonds and
the amount received in settlement therefor gave rise to a capital
loss rather than to a deduction from ordinary income under the
statutory predecessor of section 166,11 relating to bad debts. If the
creditor is paid in a transaction that does not constitute a "retire-
ment," however, he or she may realize ordinary income or loss, al-
though a sale of the claim would have produced capital gain or
loss.
The general rule of section 1232(a)(1) is qualified by sections
1232(b) and 1232(c) if the taxpayer realizes gain on an instrument
that was issued at a discount or that was purchased after the de-
tachment of interest coupons. These provisions separate the inter-
est component of the taxpayer's gain from the "true" capital gain
component and treat it as ordinary income, and they are applicable
to gain realized on a sale or exchange, as well to gain realized on
retirement.
Worthless Securities
When property becomes worthless, the taxpayer's loss is usu-
ally an ordinary loss, even if the property is a capital asset, because
the property has not been "sold or exchanged" within the meaning
of section 1222. For this reason, a taxpayer who holds deteriorating
property until it becomes totally worthless may be better off than
if he or she sells the property for a nominal consideration. The
taxpayer in McClain v. Commissioner,8" for example, received $125
82. See Wilson v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 663, 669 (1978) (acq.) (pre-1955 water refund
contracts not "in registered form"; extensive discussion); Rivers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
663 (1968) (acq.) (requirements of LR.C. § 1232(a) not met as to pre-1955 notes). The
phrases "with interest coupons" and "in registered form" also appear in LR.C. § 165(g)
(relating to worthless securities). See notes 86-90 & accompanying text infra.
83. 311 U.S. 527 (1941).
84. Id. at 530.
85. LR.C. § 23(k)(1935).
86. 311 U.S. 527 (1941).
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from an insolvent debtor for debentures costing $24,750, resulting
in a capital loss of $24,625, although under the law in force for the
taxable year before the court he would have incurred an ordinary
loss of $24,750 if they had become totally worthless. 87 Section
165(g)(1) eliminates disparities of this type for an important cate-
gory of capital assets by providing that if a "security" becomes
worthless during the taxable year, the resulting loss shall be
treated as a loss from the sale or exchange of the security on the
last day of the taxable yedr.85 The term "security" is broadly de-
fined by IRC section 165(g)(2) to mean corporate stock; the right
to subscribe for or receive corporate stock; and bonds, debentures,
notes, certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness issued by a
corporation or by a government or political subdivision thereof,
with interest coupons or in registered form.
Several limits on the scope of section 165(g)(1) should be
noted. First, section 165(g)(1) applies only to securities issued by
corporations or political bodies. A loan to an individual or to a
partnership will give rise to a bad debt deduction from ordinary
income when it becomes worthless, although a sale before it be-
came worthless would have produced a capital loss."9 This dispar-
ity is eliminated for taxpayers other than corporations if the
worthless obligation is a "nonbusiness debt," because IRC section
166(d) then imposes short term capital loss treatment; but even in
this situation there is a residual disparity, because a sale of the
claim would have produced either a long term or a short term capi-
tal loss, depending on the holding period.
Second, even if the borrower is a corporation or a political
body, section 165(g)(1) does not apply to, loans if there is no evi-
dence of indebtedness or if the evidence of indebtedness is not
coupon bearing or in registered form. When section 165(g)(1) is in-
applicable, the taxpayer's deduction on worthlessness is governed
by section 166(a) (relating to bad debts), subject to the restriction
87. Id. at 528. This disparity was eliminated in 1938, when the statutory predecessor
of I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) was enacted. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 23(g)(2), 52 Stat. 461.
88. Backstopping I.R.C. § 165(g)(1), I.R.C. § 166(e) provides that the general rule of
§ 166, permitting a deduction for bad debts, does not apply to debts evidenced by "securi-
ties" as defined by § 165(g)(2)(C).
89. For unsuccessful efforts to charge off the uncollectible portion of a partially worth-
less debt when the claim is sold, see Ardela, Inc., [1969] T.C.M. (P-H) 1 69,083 (taxpayer
entitled only to capital loss attributable to sale, not to ordinary bad debt deduction). But
see Levine v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1121 (1959) (acq.) (partial charge-off valid if indepen-
dent of subsequent disposition of claim).
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of section 166(d) described in the preceding paragraph.
Third, when section 165(g)(1) applies, the worthless security is
treated as though it had been sold on the last day of the taxable
year, presumably because it is difficult enough to determine the
year of worthlessness without endeavoring to pinpoint the day,
which may give the taxpayer a long term capital loss even if a sale
a few days earlier would have resulted in a short term capital loss.
Fourth, by virtue of section 165(g)(3), the general rule of sec-
tion 165(g)(1) is ordinarily inapplicable if the taxpayer is a domes-
tic corporation and the worthless securities were issued by an "af-
filiated" corporation. A corporation is "affiated" with the
taxpayer for this purpose if (a) stock possessing at least eighty per-
cent of the voting power of all classes of stock plus eighty percent
of each class of nonvoting stock is owned directly by the taxpayer
and (b) more than ninety percent of its gross receipts for all tax-
able years came from sources other than royalties, dividends, gains
from the sale or exchange of stock and securities, -or similar
sources.9 The restriction of section 165(g)(3) serves to approxi-
mate the treatment that would have been accorded to the loss if it
had been incurred directly by the taxpayer. For example, if a sub-
sidiary is used to conduct manufacturing operations and the par-
ent's investment in the subsidiary's stock and securities becomes
worthless, the loss can be deducted by the parent from ordinary
income, paralleling the deductions that the parent would have in-
curred had it conducted the same operations without the interven-
tion of the subsidiary. If the subsidiary had been engaged in in-
vestment activities, however, the gross receipts restriction 1 would
not be satisfied, with the result that it would not be an affiliated
corporation; hence, the parent's loss would be subject to the gen-
eral rule of section 165(g)(1) (capital loss), rather than to the spe-
cial rule of section 165(g)(3) (noncapital treatment). Here again,
the result usually parallels the result achieved by directly con-
ducting the activities through the parent. Section 165(g)(3) applies,
however, only if the securities of the affiliated corporation become
worthless, not if they are sold.
Finally, section 165(g)(1) is also limited by IRC section 1244,
which allows losses on so-called small business stock to be de-
ducted from ordinary income, up to $50,000 per taxpayer ($100,000
90. See LR.C. § 165(g)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(d)(2) (1956).
91. See note 90 & accompanying text supra.
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for husband and wife filing a joint return) for each taxable year.
Losses on stock in a company operating under the Small Business
Investment Act of 19582 are also deductible from ordinary income,
by virtue of IRC section 1242.
Cancellation of Leases and Distributorships
As explained earlier, when a contract is terminated or can-
celled in exchange for a payment by one contracting party to the
other, it is at least arguable that the recipient of the payment has
not engaged in a "sale or exchange" of any rights under the re-
scinded contract, because the rights do not survive the transac-
tion.93 This "disappearing asset" theory was employed by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Starr
Brothers, 4 decided in 1953, to deny capital gain treatment to a
payment received by a distributor from a manufacturer for agree-
ing to terminate an exclusive agency contract, even though the
contract was concededly a capital asset.9 5
Section 1241, enacted in 1958, gets the taxpayer over the "sale
or exchange" hurdle in this situation if the payment is received by
a lessee for the cancellation of a lease or a distributor of goods for
the cancellation of a distributor's agreement, provided he or she
has a substantial capital investment in the distributorship." The
Treasury Regulations define "cancellation" to include a "partial
cancellation" if the change relates to a severable economic unit,
such as a portion of the leased premises, a distinct geographical
area or product, or a part of the agreement's unexpired term.7
Payments for modifications in a contract that do not amount to a
"cancellation," however, are outside the scope of section 1241. The
regulations also provide that the term "distributor of goods" ex-
cludes purveyors of personal services, such as insurance agents and
securities brokers, and that the phrase "substantial capital invest-
ment in the distributorship" refers to such physical assets as in-
ventories of tangible goods, machinery and equipment, and storage
facilities, and is not satisfied by the equipment required to main-
92. Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689 (1958) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18
U.S.C.).
93. See notes 32-40 & accompanying text supra.
94. 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
95. Id. at 674.
96. I.R.C. § 1241.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.1241-1(b) (1960).
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tain an office for clerical purposes. 98
Section 1241 is now of minor importance, because the "disap-
pearing asset" theory that it supersedes has been significantly cur-
tailed by the courts,99 and payments to lessees for the cancellation
of leases have been held by the courts to qualify for capital gain or
loss treatment independently of section 1241.100 Moreover, being
addressed only to the "sale or exchange" prerequisite to capital
gain or loss treatment, section 1241 does not prevent the IRS from
relying on the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine for deny-
ing capital gain treatment when appropriate. 011 Finally, because
section 1241 is explicitly limited to payments received by lessees
and distributors, it has no bearing on contract termination pay-
ments received by lessors and manufacturers from their lessees and
distributors, which are likely to be treated as substitutes for ordi-
nary income.102
Franchises, Trademarks, and Trade Names
When a taxpayer receives periodic payments contingent on the
productivity or use of transferred property, the IRS has tradition-
ally argued that the payments do not constitute capital gains be-
cause they do not entail a bunching of income into a single year. If
the transferor not only arranges for payment in installments over a
period of years but also retains supervisory authority over the
transferee's business practices in the interim, resistance by the IRS
to capital gain treatment is ordinarily even stiffer, on the theory
that the continuing relationship is typical of a license or joint ven-
ture and correspondingly antithetical to the statutory requisite of a
"sale or exchange" of the property. Because both of the character-
istics raising the hackles of the IRS are common in business ar-
rangements for the transfer of franchises, trademarks, and trade
names, this area became an important battleground for a struggle
98. Id. § 1.1241-1(c).
99. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962) (discussed at notes 36-40
& accompanying text supra).
100. See, e.g., Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drumond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953); Miller v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 649 (1967) (acq.).
101. See Kathman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 125 (1968) (food distributor denied capi-
tal gain treatment of payments to release salesperson from exclusive purchase arrangement,
relying on Ferrer).
102. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
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between taxpayers, bearing the "sale" banner aloft, and the IRS,
which contended that the typical agreement was a "license" pro-
ducing ordinary income.
After a series of inconclusive skirmishes in the courts, 103 Con-
gress intervened in 1969 by enacting IRC section 1253, which deals
separately with retained powers and contingent payments. As to
retained powers, section 1253(a) provides that "[a] transfer of a
franchise, trademark, or trade name shall not be treated as a sale
or exchange of a capital asset if the transferor retains any signifi-
cant power, right, or continuing interest [as defined] with respect
to the subject matter" of the transferred property. As for contin-
gent payments, section 1253(c) provides that "[a]mounts received
. . . on account of a transfer, sale, or other disposition of a
franchise, trademark, or trade name . . . shall be treated as . . .
received from the sale or other disposition of" a noncapital asset if
"contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of" the trans-
ferred property. These two basic rules are discussed separately be-
low,104 along with the status of transfers that are outside the scope
of section 1253105 and the treatment of the transferee.106
Section 1253(b)(1) defines the term "franchise" to include
agreements giving one of the parties the right to "distribute, sell,
or provide goods, services, or facilities within a specified area."'1L"
Transfers of franchises to engage in professional sports are ex-
cluded by section 1253(e), but franchises to operate sports facilities
for the public are within the statutory coverage. The term "trade-
mark" has the meaning assigned to it by the Trademark Act of
1946, which defines "trademark" to include "any word, name, sym-
bol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others."108 The Senate
103. For a review of the cases involving transfers before the enactment of I.R.C.
§ 1253, see Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 5796 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd in part and remanded, 575 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Hall, Tax
Aspects of Franchising Operations, 20 TUL. TAx INST. 102 (1971); Comment, Federal Taxa-
tion of Franchise Sales, 44 WASH. L. Rav. 617 (1969).
104. See notes 114-20 & accompanying text infra.
105. See notes 121-22 & accompanying text infra.
106. See note 123 & accompanying text infra.
107. I.R.C. § 1253(b)(1). But see Anderson v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1085 (D.
Minn. 1979) (payment received for release of right of first refusal relating to operation of
franchised hotel not subject to LR.C. § 1253).
108. Trademark Act of 1946, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
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Finance Committee's Report on section 1253 states that the term
"trade name" includes a "trade brand."109
Although neither section 1253 nor the legislative committee
reports mention the issue, the proposed regulations provide that
section 1253 includes the transfer of franchises, trademarks, and
trade names incident to the transfer of a going business.110
The payments subjected by section 1253 to ordinary income
treatment are analogized to royalties by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee,"" but they are not formally designated as such by section
1253 itself; and the proposed regulations provide that their status
as royalty income under provisions "specifically relating to royal-
ties" shall be determined under those sections. 1 2
Retained Powers
If the transferor of a franchise, trademark, or tradb name re-
tains "any significant power, right, or continuing interest," the
transaction does not qualify for capital gain or loss treatment
under section 1253(a), even if some or all of the payments are fixed
in amount, rather than contingent, and are paid in a lump sum.
Although enacted to deny capital gain treatment, sections 1253(a)
and 1253(c) are evenhanded in the sense that they permit the
transferor to deduct losses from ordinary income,1 3 but this privi-
lege can seldom be exercised because franchises, trademarks, and
trade names rarely have a cost basis in the transferor's hands.
Recommending the enactment of section 1253(a), the Senate
Finance Committee made the following comments on its underly-
ing theory:
Some transferors retain significant powers, rights, or continu-
ing interests with respect to the subject matter of the franchise,
trademark, or trade name. The committee believes that if the
transferor exercises continuing, active, operational control of a
franchise, trademark, or trade name, by retaining significant pow-
ers, rights or continuing interests, that exercise of control is in-
consistent with a sale or exchange of property.
In addition, some transferors participate so substantially in
109. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 211, reprinted in [19691 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nzws 2027, 2246 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 91-552].
110. 36 Fed. Reg. 13,151 (1971).
111. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 109, at 208-09.
112. 36 Fed. Reg. 13,149 (1971).
113. S. Rm. No. 91-552, supra note 109, at 209.
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the day-to-day management of the transferee's business activities
and operations that the transferor in effect has an operational in-
terest in the transferee's business operations. For example, a
transferor may participate in the business by conducting activi-
ties such as sales promotion (including advertising), sales and
management training, employee training programs, holding of na-
tional meetings for transferees, providing the transferees with
blue prints or formulae, and other forms of continuing assistance.
The committee believes that any general control of the trans-
feree's activities and operations by the transferor constitutes the
retention of a significant power, right, or continuing interest."4
In keeping with this rationale, section 1253(b)(2) defines "sig-
nificant power, right, or continuing interest" very broadly to in-
clude-without being limited to-six categories of rights with re-
spect to the transferred interest: (1) a right to disapprove
assignments of the interest; (2) a right to terminate the transfer at
will; (3) a right to prescribe quality standards for the products, ser-
vices, and promotional equipment and facilities; (4) a right to re-
quire the transferee to sell or advertise only the transferor's service
and products; (5) a right to require the transferee to purchase sub-
stantially all supplies and equipment from the transferor; and (6) a
right to payments contingent on productivity, use, or disposition of
the subject matter of the transferred interest if they are a substan-
tial element of the transfer agreement. 115 In addition to these spe-
cific instances of a forbidden "significant power, right, or continu-
ing interest," attention must also be given to the reference in the
Senate Finance Committee's Report to participation by the trans-
feror in the transferee's business operations by sales promotion,
management training, "and other forms of continuing
assistance."""n
Contingent Payments
Even if the transferor of a franchise, trademark, or trade name
escapes the ordinary income rule of section 1253(a) by relinquish-
ing all significant powers, rights, and interests, section 1253(c) pro-
vides that amounts contingent on "productivity, use, or disposi-
tion" of the transferred interest are to be treated as received from
114. Id. at 208.
115. See 36 Fed. Reg. 13,151 (1971).
116. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 109, at 208. See 36 Fed. Reg. 13,151 (1971).
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the sale or other disposition of a noncapital asset.117 When recom-
mending this treatment for contingent payments, the Senate Fi-
nance Committee observed that "the receipt of contingent pay-
ments could be viewed [by the courts] as constituting a continuing
economic interest in the subject matter as well as being analogous
to the receipt of royalty or rental income." 18 The Committee did
not attempt to reconcile this approach with the treatment of pat-
ent royalties under IRC section 1235, which grants capital gain
treatment even if the licensor is a professional inventor.
Section 1253 does not define the phrase "contingent on the
productivity, use, or disposition" of the transferred franchise,
trademark, or trade name, but the Senate Finance Committee ex-
plains the statutory language as follows:
Contingent payments would include continuing payments (other
than installment payments of a principal sum agreed upon in the
transfer agreement) measured by a percentage of the selling price
of products marketed or based on the units manufactured or sold,
or any other similar method based upon production, sale or use,
or disposition of the franchise, trademark, or trade name
transferred. 9
As this extract from the Senate Finance Committee's Report
indicates, section 1253(c) disqualifies only contingent payments;
fixed amounts, whether paid in a lump sum or installments, can
qualify for capital gain treatment even if received in addition to
contingent payments subject to section 1253(c). But this possibility
is diluted by section 1253(b)(2)(F), providing that a right to con-
tingent payments is a "significant power, right, or continuing inter-
est" for purposes of section 1253(a) if the payments "constitute a
substantial element under the transfer agreement." Unless the
contingent payments are modest by comparison with the fixed pay-
ments, this seems to mean that section 1253(a), rather than the
narrower rule of section 1253(c), will apply; this in turn disqualifies
all payments for capital gain or loss treatment, whether contingent
or not.
Transfers Outside the Scope of Section 1253
Section 1253 denies capital gain or loss treatment on the
117. For a discussion of losses, see text accompanying note 114 supra.
118. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 109, at 208-09.
119. Id. at 210. See 36 Fed. Reg. 13,151 (1971).
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transfer of franchises, trademarks, and trade names if the trans-
feror retains significant powers or receives contingent payments,
but it does not explicitly deal with other transfers of such inter-
ests. To qualify for capital gain or loss treatment, therefore, trans-
fers that are outside the scope of section 1253 must satisfy the gen-
eral capital gain rules requiring a "sale or exchange" of a "capital
asset."
The "sale or exchange" requirement will ordinarily be satisfied
by any transfer that escapes the clutches of section 1253, since to
escape, the transferor must relinquish all significant rights, powers,
and continuing interests and eschew contingent payments. But the
fact that a transfer is outside the scope of section 1253 does not
provide any assurance that the transferred franchise, trademark, or
trade name is a "capital asset" in the transferor's hands. This
point was made by the Senate Finance Committee's Report on sec-
tion 1253:
The nature of some franchise, trademark, or trade name
transactions support a determination that the property trans-
ferred by transferors is property held primarily for sale in the or-
dinary course of business. For example, if property is held for
only a short time before it is sold-which may not be unusual in
some franchise operations-there is an indication that the prop-
erty is held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business
(i.e., that it was acquired with an intention to sell it). It also may
not be unusual for a franchisor to transfer as many as 15 or 20 or
more subfranchises in the course of a given year, and although a
number of sales of property in a given year does not necessarily
place the seller in a business, a number of sales does suggest an
intention to hold the property primarily for sale. In addition, it is
not unusual for some franchisors to divide their territories into a
number of smaller franchises for marketing purposes and to sell
them to individual franchisees. As is the case in determining the
status of a dealer in real estate [under IRC section 1237], the sub-
division of property and its sale in a market which differs quan-
titatively from that in which it was purchased indicates an opera-
tion and sales activity consistent with holding the property
primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business.120
Although section 1253 does not explicitly so provide, it applies
120. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 109, at 209. For a case holding that franchises
were held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business,
see Devine v. Commissioner, 558 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1977).
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on a mandatory basis only to transfers after December 31, 1969,121
but because the term "transfer" is defined by section 1253(b)(3) to
include the "renewal" of a franchise, trademark, or trade name,
payments under pre-1970 agreements become subject to section
1253 if the agreement is renewed after December 31, 1969.
Tax Treatment of the Transferee
Section 1253(d) provides rules for the transferee of a
franchise, trademark, or trade name that are roughly parallel to
the rules governing the transferor. First, amounts paid or incurred
that are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
transferred interest can be deducted by the transferee under IRC
section 162, relating to trade or business expenses. 2 Second, if the
transfer is subject to section 1253(a), noncontingent payments dis-
charging a principal sum agreed upon in the transfer agreement
are, in general, deductible over an appropriate period of years.
This result is accomplished by three rules: (1) A single payment
made in discharge of the principal sum is deductible ratably over a
ten-year period or the life of the agreement, whichever is shorter;
(2) payments that are part of a series of approximately equal pay-
ments over either the life of the agreement or a period of more
than ten years are deductible when made; and (3) other payments
are deductible in the years specified by the regulations, consistent
with the preceding principles. 123
Miscellaneous "Statutory Sales"
The IRC contains many other "statutory sale" provisions, re-
quiring certain transactions to be treated as sales or exchanges
whether or not they are encompassed by the normal meaning of
that term.124 The most important of these statutory sale provisions
are summarized below.
121. See Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 516(d)(3), 83 Stat. 648; 36 Fed. Reg. 13,148, 13,149
(1971) (election to be governed by LR.C. § 1253 on payments during 1970 through 1979
under transfers before 1970). For the status of payments subject to pre-1970 law, see Con-
solidated Foods Corp. v. United States, 569 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1978) (extensive review of
case law).
122. LR.C. § 1253(d)(1).
123. Id. § 1253(d)(2).
124. See notes 1-77 & accompanying text supra.
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Involuntary Conversions
In William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., the Supreme Court held
that destruction of the taxpayer's business plant by fire and subse-
quent recovery of the insurance proceeds did not constitute a "sale
or exchange" within the meaning of the statutory predecessor of
section 1222.125 By virtue of the last sentence of IRC section
1231(a), however, if a taxpayer's losses on the involuntary conver-
sion by casualty or theft of property used in a trade or business
and capital assets held for more than one year do not exceed his or
her gains on such transactions, both the losses and the gains go
from this "preliminary hotchpot" to the section 1231 regular
"hotchpot" (along with certain other gains and losses), and if the
regular hotchpot gains exceed the hotchpot losses, both are treated
as gains and losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets.
Short Sales
When a. short sale is closed out by the delivery of stock or
other property in satisfaction of the seller's obligations, it is debat-
able whether the transferred property has been sold or exchanged.
Section 1233(a) gets the taxpayer over this obstacle by providing
that gain or loss on the transaction shall be attributed to the sale
or exchange of a capital asset if the transferred property consti-
tutes a capital asset in the taxpayer's hands, 126 and IRC sections
1233(b) and 1233(d) promulgate three special rules to deal with
tax-avoidance transactions employing short sales.
Lapse of Options to Buy or Sell Property
If the holder of an option to purchase property fails to exercise
it, its expiration does not constitute a sale or exchange in common
parlance, but IRC section 1234(a) provides that it shall neverthe-
less be so treated if the property subject to the option is, or would
be, a capital asset in the taxpayer's hands. Similarly, gain realized
by the grantor of a lapsed option is treated as gain from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset despite the absence of an actual sale or
exchange.
125. See notes 1-5 & accompanying text supra.
126. I.R.C. § 1233(a).
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Transfer of All Substantial Rights to a Patent
Section 1235 provides that a transfer of all substantial rights
to a patent (or an undivided interest therein) by an inventor or
other "holder" shall be treated as a sale or exchange of a capital
asset, regardless of whether the payments are payable periodically
or are contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the
transferred property.12 7 In addition to protecting the taxpayer
against an IRS claim that a transfer contingent on the productiv-
ity, use, or disposition of the patent is not a "sale or exchange,"
section 1235 serves a more dramatic function-permitting royalties
to be reported as capital gain even if the inventor is a professional
who holds patents for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business.
Special rules are also provided for the following transactions:
the cutting of timber and the disposition of coal or domestic iron
ore; 1 8 corporate distributions, redemptions, partial and complete
liquidations, and other transactions; 1 2 partnership distributions;13 0
lump-sum distributions by qualified employee retirement plans;131
and transfers of appreciated property to foreign corporations,
trusts, and partnerships.132
Conclusion
Most routine dispositions of investment assets easily satisfy
the statutory "sale or exchange" requirement of section 1222 and
thus are eligible for capital gain or loss treatment in the computa-
tion of taxes. In important peripheral situations, however, the
transaction involved does not constitute a conventional sale or ex-
change. The result has been that in interpreting the sale or ex-
change requirement, courts have classified certain transactions as
generating ordinary income or ordinary loss, although a sale of the
same property prior to the event would have produced capital gain
or loss. In some of these situations, Congress has intervened to
127. Id. § 1235.
128. Id. § 631.
129. See, e.g., id. § 301(c)(3) (distributions in excess of basis); id. § 302(a) (redemp-
tions of stock); id. § 303 (same); id. § 331(a) (partial and complete liquidations); id.
§ 357(c)(1) (certain liabilities in excess of basis).
130. Id. § 731.
131. Id. §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2).
132. See id. §§ 1057, 1491.
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provide by statute that an event should or should not be treated as
a "sale or exchange." Because attention is usually focused on the
more fundamental statutory requirement that the property must
qualify as a "capital asset," the accompanying requirement of a
sale or exchange, or of a "statutory sale," is often overlooked, re-
sulting in a trap for the unwary.
